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Abstract
Conceptual analysis has been typically recognized as a traditional methodology within analytic
philosophy, but many philosophers have heavily criticized it. In contrast, the methodology of
Carnapian explication has been undergoing a revival as a methodological alternative due to its
revisionary aim. I will make explicit the shared structural properties and goals of Carnapian
explication and the kind of conceptual analysis advanced by the advocates of the Canberra
Plan. Also, I will argue that although their goal to make philosophy more scientic is desirable,
they cannot achieve their goal of clearly distinguishing philosophy from science. Moreover,
since traditional conceptual analysis is an element of both revisionary methodologies, it is also
unable to mark a clear distinction between them. The comparison throws some light on the
relationship between traditional conceptual analysis and the two revisionary methodologies,
their implicit theoretical commitments and deciencies.
1. Introduction
Analysis has always played a central role in philosophical method, “but it has been un-
derstood and practiced in many different ways.” (Beaney 2018) There is more than one
way to distinguish different strands of analysis, but for the purposes of this paper, the
distinction that is most important is the one between descriptive analysis and revisionary
analysis (Dutilh Novaes & Geerdink 2017, 71). The rst sort of analysis is essentially a
descriptive task that seeks to clarify and describe our ordinary concepts. The second sort
seeks to transform our concepts to fulll a specic purpose.
Within analytic philosophy, analysis as a descriptive methodology derives chiey from
Moore’s views (Carnap 1963a, 68–69; Dutilh Novaes & Geerdink 2017, 70). Moore (1899,
182) and his followers, the philosophers of ordinary language and their heirs (Kelly 2005;
Kelly 2008; Ryle 1949; Strawson 1959), stress common sense beliefs as the locus of
philosophical analysis. The resulting view is that the task of philosophy reduces to the
analysis of our ordinary concepts expressed in natural language. This analysis, which I call
traditional conceptual analysis, consists in the clarication and description of our ordinary
concepts. This is usually accomplished (and tested) by reecting on actual and possible
cases, and seeing whether the concept under investigation applies in those cases (Jackson
1998a).
On the other hand, analysis as a revisionary methodology, stems from Russell’s views.
From this perspective, our natural languages and our set of common beliefs are inadequate
for philosophical purposes we must rene our common concepts, vocabulary, and beliefs.
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Concerning his stance toward ordinary language philosophers like Strawson, Russell claims
that he is “persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any
attempt to be precise and accurate requires modication of common speech both as regards
vocabulary and as regards syntax.” (Russell 1957, 387) Here, the view is that philosophical
methodology is or should best be revisionary. Carnap corroborates this distinction when he
asserts that:
Only slowly did I recognize how large the divergence is between the views of the two wings of
analytic philosophy in the question of natural versus constructed languages: the view which I
shared with my friends in the Vienna Circle and later with many philosophers in the United States,
and the view of those philosophers who are chiey inuenced by G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein. It
seems to me that one explanation of this divergence is the fact that in the Vienna Circle mathematics
and empirical science were taken as models representing knowledge in its best, most systematized
form, toward which all philosophical work on problems of knowledge should be oriented. By
contrast, Wittgenstein’s indifferent and sometimes even negative attitude toward mathematics and
science was accepted by many of his followers, impairing the fruitfulness of their philosophical
work. (1963a, 68–69)
More recently, we see again two apparently opposing views on what the correct method of
philosophy is. One can be regarded as a direct heir of traditional conceptual analysis. This
is the view that philosophy employs conceptual analysis in a preparatory stage to serious
metaphysics. Two of the most inuential modern advocates of the so-called “Canberra
Plan” support this view: David Chalmers and Frank Jackson (Chalmers & Jackson 2001;
Jackson 1998a). On the other hand, we see philosophers who conceive of philosophy as
the task of explicating and/or engineering concepts.1 They are the heirs of Carnapian
explication (Brun 2016; Carus 2008; Dutilh Novaes 2018; Justus 2012).
Both approaches are very similar in many respects. As I will demonstrate, one can
quite condently view the project of the Canberra Plan not only as an heir of traditional
conceptual analysis but simultaneously as an instance of, or at least a methodology that
overlaps with the wider revisionary version. This paper is not the rst attempt to nd
commonalities between Carnapian explication and other philosophical methodologies.
There are several attempts to nd common features between Carnapian explication and
other forms of theoretical renement. For example, according to Uebel (2012), there
is a common feature between explication and what he calls the “bipartite conception
of metatheory”. That is, the relationship between the explicandum and the explicatum
(explication) is similar to the relationship between the language of existing empirical
sciences and the possible languages of sciences (the bipartite conception of metatheory).
Dutilh Novaes (2018) argues that explication and ameliorative analysis, as developed by
Haslanger (2000), have features in common. Specically, they seek to improve our ordinary
concepts. Brun (2017) suggests that explication and reective equilibrium can be seen as
two aspects of one method. Shepherd and Justus (2015) argue that experimental philosophy
can play a role in explication.
This paper can be regarded as a contribution to this literature. Firstly, I will introduce
the method of explication. Secondly, I will introduce the method of conceptual analysis
defended by two of the most inuential advocates of the Canberra Plan (Chalmers and
1 See Cappelen 2018 for a recent comprehensive introduction to conceptual engineering.
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Jackson). Thirdly, I will draw a systematic comparison between both approaches. I will
focus on the parallels between each element of their two-step methodology. Finally, I will
point out their relationship with traditional conceptual analysis and some difculties with
these methodologies: their commitment to a purely conceptual and a priori component as
a way to distinguish science from philosophy and the lack of a clear distinction between
the two steps of their methodologies.
2. The methodology of explication
Explications are omnipresent in philosophy and science. Typical philosophical examples
are Tarski’s explication of truth and Hempel’s explication of explanation. In science,
we have the explication of prescientic concepts like hardness, work, poverty, race,
etc. This methodology has its roots in Carnap’s work. He dened the process of explication
as follows:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact
one or, rather, in replacing the rst by the second. We call the given concept (or the term used
for it) the explicandum, and the exact concept proposed to take the place of the rst (or the term
proposed for it) the explicatum. (Carnap 1950, 3; see also Carnap 1963b)
In his Logical foundations of probability (Carnap 1950), Carnap tried to provide an ex-
plication of the three interrelated concepts: probability, conf_irmation and induction.
Other examples are the explications of ordinary concepts like f_ish and salt. Fish, the
explicandum, is replaced by the concepts expressed by the biological term “piscis,” the
explicatum.2 This concept is characterized within the conceptual framework of biological
theory as “cold-blooded aquatic vertebrates [that] have gills throughout life.” (Carnap 1950,
6) Salt is replaced by the scientic concept NaCl. Carnap also allowed for the explication
of other, ordinary, but more philosophically controversial concepts like causality, life,
mind and justice (Carnap 1950, 4). So, the scope of application of explication is wide, it
ranges from ordinary to philosophical and scientic concepts.
Carnap suggested four requirements that an adequate explication must fulll: similarity,
exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity (Carnap 1950, 7). Similarity, the rst requirement,
demands that the replacing concept be sufciently similar to the replaced concept. This is
an essential requirement, because if it is not fullled, then one cannot guarantee that we are
talking about the same subject.3 This requisite lies at the base of the revisionary method of
explication. Similarity is what makes revision, transformation and/or amelioration possible.
2 A cautionary note about terminology. Although I often speak of terms, my interest is in concepts: in the cognitive
content of terms. Although Carnap often speaks of terms and concepts interchangeably (Carnap 1950, 3),
explication is better understood as dealing with the content of concepts. This is also true of the Canberra Plan.
Jackson uses the “the word ‘concept’ partly in deference to the traditional terminology which talks of conceptual
analysis, and partly to emphasize that though our subject is the elucidation of the various situations covered by bits
of language according to one or another language user, or by the folk in general, it is divorced from considerations
local to any particular language.” (Jackson 1998a, 33) For Jackson, the “focus is on getting clear about the cases
covered rather than on what does the covering, the word per se.” (Jackson 1998a, 33)
3 Strawson’s 1963 famous objection focuses precisely on this point. He claims that Carnapian explication changes
the subject.
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Exactness requires the introduction of the explicatum into a body of scientic concepts.
Ideally, this body of concepts must be a formal language with explicit meaning postulates
and transformation rules. The resulting relations between the explicatum and the body of
concepts would be more precise (Carnap 1950, 7). Later, Carnap adopts a more exible
approach. The only necessary requirement for exactness then is that the explicatum be
more precise than the explicandum. It does not matter whether the explicatum belongs
either to scientic or ordinary language (Carnap 1963b, 935), though scientic language
is almost always more exact than ordinary language. For example, we have the concepts
of hot and cold. These can be made more precise if we replace them with comparative
concepts like warmer and colder, and can be made even more precise by replacing them
with the quantitative and scientic concept temperature.
Exactness frequently leads to the next requirement: fruitfulness. Scientists do their best
to get rid of vague concepts, because exact concepts are more useful in the formulation
of empirical laws or logical theorems. The more precise concepts like temperature and
energy, for example, often are involved in well-conrmed generalizations (Justus 2012,
169). The last requirement, simplicity, demands “simple rules for using the explicatum as
well as the simplicity of the laws which include the explicatum.” (Brun 2016, 1215) It is
added as a complementary requirement subordinated to the previous three.
Now, explication is composed of two steps:
(1) The clarication of the explicandum
(2) The specication of the explicatum (Olsson 2015, 59).
(1), “[t]he rst, preparatory step in an explication consists in the informal clarication of
the explicandum.” (Carnap 1963b, 933) This informal clarication is carried out by expla-
nations and examples which make explicit when we use and do not use the explicandum.
(2), the second step, consists of the replacement of the explicandum by the explicatum.
The explicatum usually belongs to a scientic theory. Let us analyze the structure of these
two steps in more detail.
2.1. The First Step of Explication
Carnap maintained that “one of the main tasks of philosophy is clarication and expli-
cation.” (1963c, 917) Concerning the task of clarication, Carnap states that generally
“a philosophical insight does not say anything about the world, but is merely a clearer
recognition of meanings or of meaning relations,” (1963c, 917) and that such insight,
when expressed in a sentence, is not factual but analytic. For example, the principle of
veriability or the principle that there is no synthetic a priori are “proposals for certain
explications (often not stated explicitly) and of certain assertions which, on the basis of
these explications, are analytic.” (1963c, 917)
I believe that this assertion can readily be interpreted as identifying the task of claricati-
on with the task carried out in the rst step of explication. This step is carried out before we
replace the explicandum with the explicatum. The complete process of explication requires
a second step: replacing the explicandum with the explicatum.
Now, “[w]e call the old concept, used in a more or less vague way either in everyday
language or in an earlier stage of scientic language, the explicandum.” (Carnap 1945,
513) In fact, the explicandum can also belong to “a previous stage in the development of
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scientic language.” (Carnap 1950, 3) Either way, the explicandum is, at least compared
to the explicatum, imprecise. Although it can also belong to scientic language, it is in
ordinary language where we often nd the most imprecise concepts in need of clarication.
That is why it is especially important to clarify the concepts of ordinary language. Carnap
offers a way to do it:
What X means by a certain term in contexts of a certain kind is at least practically clear to Y if
Y is able to predict correctly X’s interpretation for most of the simple, ordinary cases of the use
of the term in those contexts [. . .] An indication of the meaning with the help of some examples
for its intended use and other examples for uses not now intended can help the understanding. An
informal explanation in general terms may be added. (Carnap 1950, 4)
The clarication is carried out by giving examples and explanations. Take the ordinary
notion of salt. The way to clarify it, as Carnap suggests, is to list cases in which the term
can or cannot be applied in our ordinary talk in the household. For example, one may
mention its white appearance and its use in food preservation and seasoning.
The goal of this informal clarication is to reach “an understanding of the meaning
intended which is far from perfect theoretically but may be sufcient for practical purposes
of a discussion of possible explications.” (Carnap 1950, 5) As I will argue below, this
step corresponds roughly to the conceptual elucidation methodology found in traditional
conceptual analysis as well as in the rst step of the Canberra Plan.
2.2. The Second Step of Explication
The second step requires the formulation of more exact and fruitful concepts. This step
consists of the incorporation, through denition, of the explicandum into a system of exact
concepts which can be logical, mathematical or empirical (Carnap 1950, 3). These replace
the less useful, vaguer and more confused old concepts. That is why this step brings us
closer to the conceptual framework of scientic theory, which typically has concepts which
are more exact and fruitful.
Of course, following the later Carnap,4 “[t]he explicatum may belong to the ordinary
language, although perhaps to a more exact part of it,” (Carnap 1963a, 935–936) but
if “a still more exact explication is desired, we may go [for example] to the scientic
language of psychology” (Carnap 1963b, 934) or physics, etc. This is because it is in the
conceptual framework of scientic theories where we can nd the most exact, precise and
fruitful concepts. In this way, explication reects Carnap’s ambitions to make philosophical
methodology more scientic. Our familiarity with ordinary conceptions could readily be
sacriced in favor of theoretical virtues such as empirical adequacy.
In this manner, in the second step, we replace the explicandum by the explicatum,
which “must be given by explicit rules for its use, for example, by a denition which
incorporates it into a well-constructed system of scientic either logicomathematical or
4 The key difference between the earlier Carnap of Logical Foundations of Probability (Carnap 1950) and the
later Carnap (Carnap 1963a; 1963b; 1963c) is that the later had a more pragmatic conception of explication
(Brun 2016). The later Carnap emphasized that the departure of the explicatum from the explicandum is a practical
decision that depends on our specic purposes: on what one “regards as useful in the given case.” (Carnap 1963b,
937)
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empirical concepts.” (Carnap 1950, 3) Carnap gives several examples. For example, the
explicatum for the explicandum salt is given by the chemical concept of sodium chloride
or NaCl. Likewise, the concept (the explicandum) f_ish is replaced by the zoological
concept (the explicatum) piscis.5
In these cases, the extension of the term can be the same, as in the case of salt and
NaCl. But it can be different too, as in the case of f_ish and piscis. In this last example,
the extension differs. In particular, whales and seals are excluded from the concept piscis.
What matters is that we conserve a certain degree of similarity “in such a way that, in most
cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used.” (Carnap
1950, 4)
According to Carnap, the main reason that the explicatum is superior to the explicandum
is that the rst is more exact and fruitful. As we saw above, a concept is more fruitful “the
more it can be brought into connection with other concepts on the basis of observed facts;
in other words, the more it can be used for the formulation of laws.” (Carnap 1950, 6)
Undoubtedly, scientic concepts are usually the most exact and fruitful. They are more
exact because they belong to a more systematic conceptual framework, which is usually the
more scientic part of our language (Carnap 1963b, 936) and they are particularly fruitful
because of their connection with observed facts. Thereby, the second step of explication
demonstrates the Carnapian desire to bring philosophy closer to science.
3. The methodology of the Canberra plan
In the previous section, we saw the two steps of the methodology of explication. In this
section, we will see the two steps of the methodology of the Canberra Plan. The Canberra
Plan is a form of conceptual analysis that has its origins in the treatment of theoretical terms
by Ramsey (1929) and Carnap (1963d). The meaning of theoretical terms could be dened
by their role in a scientic theory. Later, David Lewis (Lewis 1970) extended this treatment
to the denition of folk terms by their role in a folk theory like folk psychology and
supplemented this treatment by providing a way to identify the referents of the folk terms
on the basis of empirical investigation. Since then, the Canberra Plan has been developed
by Frank Jackson (Jackson 1998a) and David Chalmers (Chalmers 2001) (henceforth, the
“Planners”).
Stich and Weinberg say of Jackson’s defense of conceptual analysis that “[i]t is, by a
long shot, the most sophisticated defense of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy
that has ever been offered.” (Stich & Weinberg 2001, 637) This new methodology adds
some elements which are not present in the traditional version. For example, the Canberra
Plan’s version of conceptual analysis appeals to science to determine or adjust our ordinary
concepts, more specically, to determine or adjust the extension of our concepts. In this
sense, this kind of conceptual analysis is more naturalistic. This contrasts with traditional
conceptual analysis, which is only concerned with the description of our ordinary concepts.
Thus, I will refer to the Planners’ version as “naturalistic conceptual analysis” from now
on.
5 The term “sh” can be conserved to refer to the explicatum piscis, but, in order to avoid confusion, Carnap
employs the term “piscis.”
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The general structure of the methodology proposed by the advocates of naturalistic
conceptual analysis consists of two steps: (1) the characterization of concepts via the
deliverance of our intuitions when presented with actual and possible cases, and (2) de-
termining whether those concepts refer to some entity described by the sciences. As a
consequence of this second step, we must adjust our ordinary concepts to aid us in the con-
struction of a more accurate theory of the world. The resulting concepts must be vindicated
by science. Although the Planners did not explicitly enumerate the conditions of adequacy
for these concepts, this requirement seems to be the primary condition of adequacy for the
naturalistic conceptual analysis of the Canberra Plan.
3.1. The First Step
According to the advocates of the Canberra Plan, the rst step of their brand of analysis
is carried out by the philosopher in his armchair. The philosopher picks up and analyses
ordinary concepts like causality, color, belief, liberty, etc. Once selected the object of
study, the philosopher collects the platitudes associated with the concept under study. These
platitudes are made explicit6 through the reection on actual and possible cases in which
the concept could be applied. These reections make explicit our platitudes through the
act of intuiting. The “role of the intuitions about possible cases so distinctive of conceptual
analysis is precisely to make explicit our implicit folk theory.” (Jackson 1998a, 38)
For Jackson, folk theories, like folk psychology, are very important for conceptual
analysis because they determine our ordinary concepts (which in turn make up our folk
theories), and we need to know what our ordinary concepts are before we can improve
them. As Jackson puts it:
When bounty hunters go searching, they are searching for a person and not a handbill. But they
will not get very far if they fail to attend to the representational properties of the handbill on the
wanted person. These properties give them their target, or, if you like, dene the subject of their
search. Likewise, metaphysicians will not get very far with questions like: Are there Ks? Are Ks
nothing over and above Js? and, Is the K way the world is fully determined by the J way the world
is? in the absence of some conception of what counts as a K, and what counts as a J. (Jackson
1998a, 30–31)
Often it is assumed that philosophical analysis gives us the meaning of concepts. Jackson
(1998a), for example, defends a descriptivist approach about meaning (Jackson 1998b) and
sees platitudes as descriptions (see Nolan 2009, 280–281). From this perspective, platitudes
are identied with descriptive sentences, and a set of sentences denes a concept. This is
so because, for the advocates of naturalistic conceptual analysis, concepts acquire their
meaning within a folk theory which is composed of platitudes. For example, if we are
going to analyze free action, it depends upon its connections with platitudes (which are
expressed in sentences and to which we have a shared commitment) about “free action,
moral responsibility, causal explanations of various kinds, the justiability of punishment,
personal identity, and so on, along with a catalogue of those cases most obviously judged
to be of free action.” (Jackson 1994, 104)
6 Jackson asks and answers: “[w]hat’s a theory that is not explicit for S? It is one (i) S holds but (ii) S cannot give
the content in words. If S is asked on an exam to state the content of theory T, when S only knows T implicitly, S
fails that question.” (Jackson 2009, 87)
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Thus, the rst step of naturalistic conceptual analysis of concept c consists of the careful
picking and coordination of platitudes associated with c. A concept is dened by a set of
platitudes. These will be assembled into a coherent folk theory which gives meaning to the
concept under study.
This seems to bring to light the core component of philosophical methodology from
the perspective of the Canberra Plan: the analysis of concepts. Thus, the rst step consists
merely in conceptual elucidation. This part of naturalistic conceptual analysis is practically
equivalent to the methodology of traditional conceptual analysis. But, as we will see,
this methodology is also practically equivalent to the rst step of explication in that both
methodologies have the goal of clarifying our ordinary concepts.
3.2. The Second Step
The Planners promote what Jackson calls “serious metaphysics,” which accommodates
one set of entities or properties within another set of entities or properties which are more
fundamental. The Planners usually take, as an illustrative example, physical entities as the
set of fundamental entities (see Jackson 1998a and Chalmers & Jackson 2001). Thus, for
example,
[w]hen there is something that threatens to transcend the physical or the natural, the way to
demystify it is to ‘locate’ it in the natural order; this location means using conceptual analysis en
route to showing how facts about it are deducible a priori from facts about the natural order. The
key to establishing these deductions is conceptual analysis (Blackburn 2008, 24).
After conducting a conceptual analysis (the rst step), we need to appeal to science to see
whether the concepts which are the output of the rst step are implied by the vocabulary
of science. If this is so, then we must coordinate the vocabulary of the rst step with the
vocabulary of science. “The central point here is that a macroscopic description of the world
[. . .] is implied by a microscopic description [. . .]” (Chalmers & Jackson 2001, 330–
331) This is what makes metaphysics serious and interesting (Kingsbury & McKeown-
Green 2009, 160). But we can only do serious metaphysics after we have identied our
folk concepts about the subject matter. To do this implies reection “on which possible
cases fall under which descriptions. And that in turn is to do conceptual analysis.” (Jackson
1998a, 42)
Anything that we say about macroscopic entities (moral, psychological, etc.) must be
implied by and reducible to whatever is said about the microscopic fundamental entities.
This is possible only in principle because only an omniscient individual or a sufcient-
ly advanced society would be able to carry out that reduction of macroscopic terms to
microscopic terms. A society which is capable of determining, e.g., the state of all the phy-
sical elements constitutive of x could determine the functional role of that set of physical
elements and it will immediately be aware that that role is identical to the macro role.7
If the philosopher nds the referent of the theoretical role in the scientic vocabulary,
then he has achieved a connection between our folk theory and the world. The advocates
7 I have treated the ontological and the linguistic level indistinctly, but it does not seem to be a problem because the
advocates of conceptual analysis sponsor serious metaphysics at a linguistic and ontological level (see Jackson
2007, 187).
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of conceptual analysis assert that the second step of the Plan implies a sort of naturalistic
approach because this step permits the introduction of scientic vocabulary. Yet, it seems
that the second step does not imply by itself that the philosopher has to investigate the
world, it only implies that he subsumes one vocabulary under the other. On the other hand,
scientists do have to go to the world to determine the existence of the referents of scientic
terms. Philosophers ask scientists for the thing in the world that plays the role x, “and if
there is some unique particular or kind that does, we have discovered the nature of what
we set out to analyze.” (Braddon-Mitchell 2009, 25)
Therefore, the second step of the Canberra Plan consists in linking scientic theories
(their vocabulary) with folk theories (their vocabulary). This methodology seems to be
merely descriptive, but it is not. If the folk vocabulary cannot be accommodated within
the scientic one, then we must revise our folk concepts or eliminate them. If we do not
nd the entity that plays the role x, then we must be eliminativists (Jackson 1998a, 4–5), at
least for the moment (as we are now of phlogiston).
Notice that the reduction of the folk vocabulary to the scientic vocabulary is a particu-
larly strong move. This is not automatically assumed in the methodology of explication.
As we saw above, Carnap (1963b, 935) allows ordinary language explications. However,
scientic explications are preferred whenever available, because they are the most exact
and fruitful.
Now, the Planners defend that after the rst two steps are completed, we can deduce
(a priori) the concept of the entity-according-to-our-folk-theory by the concept of the
entity-according-to-our-scientic-theory. Presumably, this deduction is part of conceptual
analysis, because “conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when and whether
a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental
vocabulary.” (Jackson 1998a, 28) So, we can see at least three conceptual elements in the
metaphilosophical picture of the Canberra Plan. First, the characterization of a concept via
its platitudes (rst step). Second, the reduction of the folk vocabulary to the vocabulary
of the sciences (second step). And, nally, the deductive implication of how things are in
many respects by how they are fundamentally.
If this is right, then the fundamental, e.g., physical constitution of the world determines,
e.g., the psychological constitution of entities. Like the rst and second step this implication
is supposed to deal only with concepts (our concepts for physical and psychological
entities) and is a priori. The implication P→ Q is a priori if “it is possible to know that
P implies Q with justication independently of experience.” (Chalmers & Jackson 2001,
316) Accordingly, to know the spatiotemporal localization of every microphysical element
of the substance H2O, and to know its functional role is equivalent to understanding the
functional role of the substance water, to understand its aqueous role. This deductive
implication of the ordinary concept by the scientic vocabulary is not a step by itself but a
consequence of the previous two steps.
To illustrate what has been said so far, take the following example:8
(1) Water is the entity that plays the aqueous role.
(2) H2O is the entity that plays the aqueous role.
(3) Water is H2O.
8 For a similar example, see Jackson 2003, 87–88.
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The advocates of naturalistic conceptual analysis, as I understand them, maintain that
knowledge of (1) depends only on the activity of analyzing our concepts from the armchair
through the assessment of possible cases. It corresponds to the traditional methodology
of conceptual analysis and constitutes the rst step. (2) and the conclusion (3) constitute
the second step: coordinating (subsuming, adjusting or eliminating certain parts of) our
folk vocabulary with scientic vocabulary. This is carried out once one has recollected the
products of scientic theorizing, so it depends on the way the world is as it is known by ex-
perience, usually by scientic observation and experiment. Finally, if the Planners are right,
(3) can be deduced from (1)–(2). This is a consequence of the previous two-step process.
Thus, the methodology of naturalistic conceptual analysis is composed of two steps.
The task of the theorist reduces to conceptual elucidation, linking scientic theories to
folk ones, and making explicit conceptual implications. The Planners see philosophers as
particularly engaged in this methodology. However, they acknowledge (as Carnap does
concerning explication), as we will see below, that scientists also use it.
4. The Canberra plan’s conceptual analysis and explication:
a comparison
From what has been said it should be clear that explication and the project of the Canberra
Plan have many features in common. For example, both approaches see their recommended
methodologies as composed of two steps; both start from ordinary concepts and seek to
clarify them, and both nd in science a guide to making the necessary adjustments to our
ordinary concepts.
Unlike the traditional descriptive version of conceptual analysis sponsored by Moore,
Strawson and their followers, the Planners see themselves as looking for a more scientic
version of conceptual analysis. In fact, they move away from the more descriptive version;
they want to describe reality in the most reliable way possible. So, it is acceptable to revise
our concepts when required. After the elucidation of our concepts through the deployment
of intuitions given hypothetical cases, it is advisable to revise our concepts. That is why –
when discussing the importance of applying, as a rst step, polls to the elucidation of folk
concepts – Jackson claims:
Polls are relevant to the elucidation of one or another folk concept relating to our uses of terms like
‘expect’ and ‘believe likely.’ They are not relevant to the assessment of the edice of probabilistic
reasoning that informs current statistics. This is why the ‘they are wrong’ response is the correct one
to those who commit the gambler’s fallacy. We can think of philosophical work in epistemology
as aiming to build on some of the same folk materials [. . .] Polls won’t be relevant to assessing
the nal product. (Jackson 2011, 480)
Jackson sees the descriptive rst step as a necessary ingredient of his methodology. He
asserts that “in order to address the questions of what concepts we ought to have, we
need to start from those we in fact have.” (Jackson 2011, 480) A good case in point is
a “Gettier’s survey”, which “is an essential rst step in the discussion of the normative
question.” (Jackson 2011, 481)
The main difference between these two methodologies is that explication has broader
aims than naturalistic conceptual analysis. For Carnap, explication is primarily a tool that
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serves scientic purposes. The main purpose of this tool is to make as many empirical
generalizations as possible. But explication can be employed to improve our concepts to
almost any end we want them to play, for example, political, legal or social ends (Carus
2008; Haslanger 2000; Jenkins 2015). Besides, explication aims, in the case of logic and
mathematics, to derive as many theorems as possible. The naturalistic version of conceptual
analysis also has a purpose, although it is more restricted: to discover what there is in the
world. Science is the best way to do that, so we must look to our best scientic theories to
vindicate or correct our ordinary concepts. This usually needs the introduction of a new
concept with a corrected extension. So, in Carnapian terms, this implies the replacement
of the explicandum with an explicatum.
Thus, these two methodologies share a general feature: both acknowledge and require the
assistance of scientic theory. This feature generally leads to changes in our prescientic
concepts. We can see more nely the deployment of these characteristics if we compare
the two steps individually.
4.1. The rst step
Both methodologies start from prescientic concepts which often belong to ordinary
language and seek to adjust these concepts to what our more scientic theories report. To
this end, both employ some traditional procedures like the reection on actual and possible
cases.
As we saw above, the rst step of explication consists in describing our actual conceptual
practices through examples and informal explanations (Carnap 1950, 4). So, it seems to me
that Carnap is actually endorsing the methodology of traditional conceptual analysis as a
preparatory stage in his more revisionary approach. Of course, the advocates of traditional
conceptual analysis would not endorse the second step of the explicative process: the
revision of the original concept. In this sense, traditional conceptual analysis and Carnapian
explication seem to be irreconcilable. But the Canberra Planners, especially Jackson,
propose a version of conceptual analysis which seems not only to t with but to be a
particular instance of Carnapian explication.
Both the conceptual analysis proposed by the Planners and Carnapian explication are
designed to improve the concepts that appear in our representation of the world. However,
as I mentioned before, Carnapian explication can be used to improve our concepts not
only for cognitive or representational purposes but also for political, social and legal ones.
Furthermore, the methodology of the Canberra Plan has some characteristics that not any
practitioner of Carnapian explication needs to accept: the insistence of the Planners on
the a priori implication of what is said in the macroscopic vocabulary by what is said in
the microscopic vocabulary (Chalmers & Jackson 2001), or that we must eliminate the
concepts that are not vindicated by science (Jackson 1998a, 4–5). Generally, it is safe
to say that the methodology of the Canberra Plan has crucial structural and axiological
commonalities with Carnapian explication. More specically, one can say that the kind
of conceptual analysis proposed by the Planners is a special instance of the application of
Carnapian explication. One element that links them is their reliance on a rst, claricatory
step which could well be identied as traditional conceptual analysis.
The rst step of the Canberra Plan’s analysis invokes intuitions about a set of actual or
possible cases. These intuitions conrm or disconrm the use of a determinate concept.
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Reection on our conceptual practices reveals to us what is the correct application of a
determinate concept. The same is true for Carnapian explication. In fact, it seems that
“Carnap and Strawson could agree [. . .] conceptual analysis can help clarify the current
meaning of explicanda.” (Justus 2012, 171) In fact, in discussing the apparent tension
between Strawson’s traditional approach and explication, Carnap recognized that both
methods could be combined and that “[t]he future will show which of the two methods,
or which of the many varieties of each, or which combinations of both, furnishes the best
results.” (Carnap 1963b, 940) The explication process deals with concepts like cause,
explanation, law, truth, etc. The terms expressing these concepts “are in common
use, with more or less agreement as to where it applies.” (Kemeny 1963) Carnap claims
that “in raising problems of analysis or explication, philosophers very frequently [. . .] ask
questions like: ‘What is causality?’, ‘What is life?’, ‘What is mind?’, ‘What is justice?’,
etc.” (Carnap 1950, 4) But these concepts are not yet clear enough for explicative purposes,
so he alludes to the use of traditional conceptual analysis as a rst elucidatory step:
Even though the terms in question are unsystematic, inexact terms, there are means for reaching a
relatively good mutual understanding as to their intended meaning. An indication of the meaning
with the help of some examples for its intended use and other examples for uses not now intended
can help the understanding. An informal explanation in general terms may be added. (Carnap
1950, 4)
Accordingly, “meaning analysis may be very useful if only to search for evident examples
and non-examples and for nding further conditions of (in) adequacy for concept explica-
tion.” (Kuipers 2007, ix) Justus (2012) and other theorists (Schupbach 2017; Sytsma 2010)
have argued that the use of intuitions can serve as a preparatory step for Carnapian expli-
cation. Surely,
Carnap could even grant that proverbial ‘armchair’ conceptual analysis – where the predominant
focus is what intuitions reveal – can help identify the current meaning of an explicandum [. . .]
Carnap recognized a role for traditional philosophical approaches to such problems in the rst step
of explication. This fact is too often overlooked by critics. (Justus 2012, 173–174)
Justus favors the more empirical methods of experimental philosophy. But, in any ca-
se, intuitions are still invoked to play the role of the rst step: identify and clarify the
explicandum.9
In the same way, Jackson thinks that we must consult our intuitions because “only that
way, do we dene our subject.” (Jackson 1998a, 42) Of course, naturalistic conceptual
analysis seems to employ more resources than explication to nd the meaning of a given
concept. They recur to the evaluation of actual and possible scenarios. Carnap was not
initially aware of the importance of this procedure, but later he saw it as part of an adequate
methodology in the elucidation of our concepts. Specically, “[f]or the determination of
intension, not only actually given cases must be taken into consideration, but also possible
cases, i.e., kinds of objects which can be described without self-contradiction, irrespective
of the question whether there are any objects of the kinds described.” (Carnap 1955,
9 In this sense, the explicative process can take intuitions as the explicanda. In fact, “[i]n case of intuition explication
the subsequent task is to prove a theorem to the effect that the intuition, if reformulated in explicated terms,
becomes justied, demystied or undermined, whatever the case may be.” (Kuipers 2007, xvi)
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45) Here, “Carnap described a method for uncovering intensions that involves presenting
language users with a range of logically possible scenarios and asking them to make
judgements regarding the concept in question.”10 (Shepherd & Justus 2015, 390) In both
cases, the underlying method is the same: to clarify the explicandum via the evaluation of
examples and counterexamples for the intended use of a concept.
For Carnap, this rst step had the primary goal of reducing the ambiguity and vagueness
of the explicandum. This goal ts well with the rst step of the Canberra Plan: to get clear
about the meaning of the concept under investigation; undoubtedly, reducing ambiguity and
vagueness are important to achieve this aim. Both methodologies regard this preliminary
procedure of clarication as a precondition to the second step. Their purpose is to get clear
on the meaning of our ordinary terms, via traditional conceptual analysis, for subsequent
systematization and use.
4.2. The second step
Perhaps the main similarity between the project of the Canberra Plan and Carnap’s expli-
cation is that both encourage a revisionist task for the philosopher. For Carnap, the aim was
to bring forward precision, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity to concepts lacking these
virtues. So, “Carnapian explication is essentially an ameliorative project.” (Dutilh Novaes
& Reck 2017) “Carnap sought to undermine the standard philosophical methodology in
favor of a more scientically cognizant, inductively warranted alternative.” (Justus 2012,
177) He emphasizes that “[a] natural language is like a crude, primitive pocketknife, very
useful for a hundred different purposes. But for certain specic purposes, special tools are
more efcient, e.g., chisels, cutting machines, and nally the microtome.” (Carnap 1963b,
938)
On the other hand, Canberra Planners like Jackson want to make ordinary concepts
“scientic” in the sense that they must be vindicated by science as referring to something
in reality. This condition of adequacy requires to check whether there is some scientic
concept that has the same extension as the ordinary concept under study.
The second step of the Canberra Plan is specically designed to make our ordinary
concepts more scientic, and this makes metaphysics “serious”. However, the Planners
also encourage the renement or elimination of defective ordinary concepts. In contrast
to Carnap, the Planners are committed to doing “serious metaphysics”. Remember that,
according to Carnap, the explicatum can belong to ordinary language, although to a more
precise part of it. But for the Planners, although they allow for the existence of phenomenal
facts as fundamental entities (Chalmers & Jackson 2001), if our ordinary concepts do
not get support from science, then we must rene or eliminate them. In fact, this kind of
naturalistic conceptual analysis is seeking to address whether our ordinary concepts survive
what science tells us about the world.11 We are seeking to address, for example, “whether
10 In fact, the naturalistic version of conceptual analysis also employs the reection about possible cases to discover
intensions: A-intensions and C-intensions (Jackson 2004).
11 According to Reck, Carnapian explication is too focused on formal aspects. This makes us “blind to questions
about the appropriateness of the abstraction and idealization involved.” (Reck 2012, 109) It seems that the
addition of naturalistic conceptual analysis to Carnapian explication can answer the challenge that Reck directs to
explication because naturalistic conceptual analysis is less formal and more empirically driven.
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intentional states according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to it,
will survive what cognitive science reveals about the operations of our brains.” (Jackson
1998a, 31). Our ordinary concepts, that is to say, our folk theory can be revised if it is too
crude “in the light of one or another empirical discovery”. (Jackson 1998a, 44)
Given this corrective attitude, the Plan’s second step is not very different from the
revisionist project of explication. This step “requires us to address when matters described
in one vocabulary are made true by matters described in another.” (Jackson 1998a, 41) In
the same way, explication tries to conserve the extension of the original ordinary concept
(as Hanna (1968) argues). The new concept C′, the explicatum, “replaces a given, often
pre-theoretic concept C of philosophical interest, so that the extension of C′ coincides with
that of C in the clear-cut and uncontroversial cases.” (Leitgeb 2013, 271)
Certainly, some differences are permitted between the explicandum and the explicatum.
Although the concepts piscis and f_ish overlap in extension, they still differ. The concept
piscis is narrower because it does not include whales and dolphins. The explicatum can also
be wider than the explicandum: the explicated concept velocity includes zero velocity,
which the ordinary concept does not. Yet they still overlap in extension.
Take the concept salt, the rst step consists in assessing actual or possible cases where it
is used. For example, we assess the actual cases when we use this concept in the household.
In the second step, we give the explicatum which is given “by the compound expression
‘sodium chloride’ or the synonymous symbol ‘NaCl’ of the language of chemistry.”
(Carnap 1950, 5) It is clear that the extension is the same in both cases, at least in the sense
that it is said that the concepts water and H2O share the same extension.
As we have noted above, the Planners think that there is identity in extension between
the concepts water and H2O, and they present it as a clear example of the second step
of their methodology. To acknowledge that there is a scientic concept for something
discovered by science which has the same extension that our ordinary concept constitutes
the second step of their proposed philosophical methodology.
Notice that, analogous to the Carnapian approach, the scientic concepts cannot replace
the ordinary ones in all cases. Some differences are permitted. The scientic concept
of solidity does not include “being everywhere dense in addition to resisting encroach-
ment.” (Jackson 1998a, 3) Similarly, the scientic concept of f_ish does not include whales
(Jackson 1998a, 34–35).
In sum, Carnapian explication and the Canberra Plan share many of the features asso-
ciated with their respective rst and second steps. Although both approaches presuppose
traditional conceptual analysis at the beginning of inquiry, they seek to revise our concepts
to t what our best theories state. Thereby, both challenge Strawson’s view that: “the
language of science could not in this way supplant the language of the drawing-room, the
kitchen, the law courts and the novel.” (Strawson 1963, 505)
5. Implications for philosophical methodology: some critical remarks
My discussion scrutinized the parallels between the two methodologies of Carnapian ex-
plication and the Canberra Plan’s conceptual analysis. The parallels identied in their
revisionary aims and their two-step methodology throw some light on the relationship bet-
ween the naturalistic conceptual analysis of the Canberra Plan and Carnapian explication,
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and the relationship between these two methods and traditional conceptual analysis. In par-
ticular, it claries the role that traditional conceptual analysis plays in the two revisionary
methodologies investigated, and how these last methodologies connect philosophy with
science.
First, the initial step of Carnapian explication and of the naturalistic analysis of the
Canberra Plan consists merely in the clarication of our ordinary concepts (usually through
the assessment of possible cases). This step does not aim at improving our concepts. Now,
this is what traditional conceptual analysis does. It works with ordinary concepts and
pursues the same clarifying aim. Therefore, traditional conceptual analysis is the rst step
of both methodologies.
Second, Carnapian explication and the naturalistic analysis of the Canberra Plan aim at
improving our concepts through an appeal to science. This is the second step with which
traditional conceptual analysis disagrees. The two revisionary methodologies make use of
traditional conceptual analysis only as a preparatory step (Carnap 1963a, 933). In contrast,
traditional conceptual analysis is primarily focused on the description of folk concepts.
Finally, the naturalistic analysis of the Canberra Plan is an instance of explication or at
least overlaps with it. As we saw above, in explication, the explicatum can belong to the
realm of ordinary concepts. This contrasts with the Canberra Plan’s emphasis on scientic
concepts, especially from physics, as the result of the method. Furthermore, the advocates
of the Canberra Plan are interested in describing the world. In contrast, the methodology
of explication can perform other functions: to improve our concepts for political, legal or
social purposes.
Now, in contrast to the proposal that philosophers must limit themselves to the use of
traditional conceptual analysis (Strawson 1963), I think that the revisionary methodologies
have more potential to advance philosophical theory (surely, it is also of help for scientic
theory). Their use of scientic theory can be useful in many ways to philosophy, for
example, by providing empirical evidence to justify the use of our improved ordinary
concepts. The emphasis on exactness can be of assistance in theoretical contexts and
the elimination of vagueness is not necessarily a loss to ordinary discourse. In fact, the
purpose of communicating a future state of the world with the statement “it will be very
hot tomorrow at noon” can also be achieved if we replace the ordinary concept very
hot with the improved concept temperature (Carnap 1963b, 936). In addition, as a
methodology, traditional conceptual analysis is vindicated as part of philosophical and
scientic methodology. Yet, in one sense, there does not seem to be a clear distinction line
between the two steps of both methodologies.
Both methodologies have some important limitations. These have their root in the afore-
mentioned methodological commitment to a distinction between science and philosophy.
Take the Canberra Plan: its advocates saw the revival of conceptual analysis as a way to
distinguish philosophy from science. However, their two-step methodology is also em-
ployed by scientists, as Jackson himself acknowledges. Political scientists do conceptual
analysis, as a preparatory stage, concerning what is designated by terms like “capitalist”,
psychologists analyze the meaning of the terms used by children (Jackson 1998a, 32–33).
Like philosophers, scientists also analyze concepts (Kingsbury & McKeown-Green 2009,
173). They analyze concepts like molecule, tiger, momentum, etc. On the other hand,
philosophers seem interested in more general concepts like substance and knowledge.
However, scientists and philosophers work on the meaning of concepts like water, time
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and socialist. So, if scientists and philosophers deal with the same set of concepts or with
a subset of it, then it is not clear that the two-step methodology of the Canberra Plan is a
distinctive and essential part of philosophy.12
Similarly, Carnap wanted to distinguish philosophy from science. For the early Car-
nap, the problems of philosophy were just syntactical problems, but later he recognized
that philosophical problems are metatheoretical in nature: they included semantics and
pragmatics (Carnap 1963a, 56). Nevertheless, the methodology of explication seems to
undermine his distinction between philosophy and science. Again, both the rst and the
second step are carried out by scientists themselves. First, the scientic community has
to identify in informal terms what they are talking about; second, they try to adjust the
concepts considering what observation reveals. Carnap himself claims that “[e]xplications
are often given also by scientists, it seems to me particularly characteristic of philosophical
work that a great part of it is devoted to proposing and discussing explications of certain
basic, general concepts.” (Carnap 1963b, 933) Thus, it seems that Carnapian explication
implies that the only difference between philosophy and science lies in the generality of
the concepts employed.
Another difculty is that both approaches seem to be strongly committed to viewing
their respective rst step as a purely conceptual and a priori component. However, it
seems to rely on more than conceptual facts. If we believe that the systematization of
platitudes in a folk theory constitutes an essential element of philosophical methodology,
then, if our folk theories depend on the world, we must recognize a factual element in this
methodology. According to David Papineau (2009, 4), our folk theories keep a relationship
with the world,13 with experience, because these theories have synthetic consequences.
Take his proposal of a very small theory of pain:
(1) Body damage causes pain.
(2) Pain causes the individual to avoid more body damage.
(3) Therefore: body injuries cause the individual to avoid more body damage.
(3) is a synthetic consequence of the theory constituted by (1) and (2). Certainly, (3)
implies observable behavior, scientically veriable. Consequently, the implication of (3)
by the premises (1) and (2) means that the theory constituted by these premises keeps a
relationship with the world. The same can be said of many other philosophical concepts
like knowledge, freedom, names, etc. The activity of analyzing our concepts is partially
determined by the world. It is simply “[c]onfused and obscure ideas of conceptual truth
[that] create the illusion of a special domain for philosophical investigation.” (Williamson
2007, 4)
12 Now, if we grant that philosophy and science do conceptual analysis, then, what distinguishes science from
philosophy? Only observation and experimentation can distinguish them, but there are a lot of examples where
observation and experiment play a role in the construction, justication, and rejection of philosophical concepts
and theories. For example, the theory of relativity has had an enormous impact on presentism (only the present
is real) (see Putnam 1967 and Rietdijk 1966), and quantum mechanics in the determination of individuality
(Ladyman & Ross 2008).
13 Laurence and Margolis 2003 hold something similar.
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So, the distinction between step one and two for each of the discussed methodologies
appears to be only a procedural one, not one between a purely conceptual and an empi-
rically informed one. It must be noted that if the distinction between the rst and second
step is not possible in this sense, then it is not possible to say that the methodology of
traditional conceptual analysis belongs uniquely to philosophy. Even if philosophy limits
itself to doing conceptual analysis (the rst step), the lack of a clear borderline (in terms
of conceptual and empirical matters) between the rst and second step blocks a clear-cut
distinction between philosophy and science.
In fact, it is quite tenable that philosophers and scientists possess a set of implicit scien-
tic platitudes which are the product of their interaction with the world. These platitudes
are expressed as intuitions, which do not differ in kind from the layman in the street. The
intuitions of the scientist are just more structured, complex and based on carefully selected
empirical evidence. These theories embody experience accumulated through the lifespan of
the individual and communities of individuals (for a survey of the psychological evidence,
see Chassy & Gobet 2009; Epstein 2010).
Similarly, to entertain possible cases (remember that both approaches employ these
cases) we need to rely on our past experience with the world. As Jackson acknowledges
“language conveys putative information through being a system of representation that
divides how things are being represented to be from the other ways they might be.”
(Jackson 2004, 238) It is precisely because possible cases mirror the way the world is in
some respects that the intuitions we have when we reect on them reveal something about
the world. For example, Moorean intuitions (which are grounded on our platitudes) rely on
what is communicated to us through our senses. The intuitive statement “I have two hands”
depends on how the world is which is known by us through our senses. Thus, the inuence
of the world on our concepts is evidence that engaging in the analysis of concepts is not
entirely a conceptual activity.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a comparative analysis between two methodologies: Car-
napian explication and the naturalistic conceptual analysis of the Canberra Plan. I have
argued that, although they differ in some aspects, both approaches have many features in
common. The naturalistic conceptual analysis of the Canberra Plan can be considered a
particular instance of explication, or at least a methodology that overlaps with the more
general Carnapian one. Furthermore, traditional conceptual analysis, which is a merely
descriptive activity, is used as the rst step of both revisionary approaches.
Also, I argued that although the revisionary methodologies seem very promising, they
do not seem to be distinctive of philosophical methodology. That is because their two-
step methodology is also employed by scientists. Moreover, their rst step alone, tra-
ditional conceptual analysis, seems to depend on how the world is. But we know the
world through the methodology of science: observation and experimentation. Therefore,
traditional conceptual analysis is not an exclusive methodology of philosophy.
Surely, more research is needed to uncover the relationships between explication and
other forms of conceptual analysis: to make explicit their descriptive and revisionary com-
ponents as well as their relationship with science. Nevertheless, this paper has contributed
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to the clarication of the relationship between Carnapian explication and the Canber-
ra Plan’s conceptual analysis. It also has thrown some light on the role that traditional
conceptual analysis plays in these revisionary methodologies.14
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